State Legalization of Marijuana as a "Diagonal Federalism" Problem
Brannon P. Denning * When I hear the term "vertical separation of powers," I think primarily of how the Constitution allocates power within our federal system, as opposed to horizontal separation of powers, which allocates power among the branches of the federal government. But federalism itself has vertical and horizontal dimensions as well. Vertical federalism concerns the allocation of power between the national government and those of the states.
1 Horizontal federalism, by contrast, concerns the states' relationships with one another. 2 The Constitution and constitutional law address both aspects. Article I, for example, enumerates powers that are given to Congress; 3 while, say, Article IV addresses interstate comity in various ways. 4 But some issues implicate both aspects of federalism. This essay will discuss one: the state-level push to decriminalize the use of marijuana for medical and recreational purposes. I suggest that it ought to be regarded as a "diagonal federalism" problem calling for multi-dimensional solutions.
What I am calling diagonal federalism is simply my too-clever-by-half term for an issue-like legalization of marijuana-that implicates federalism's vertical and horizontal axes. 5 In this regard, marijuana occupies a space not unlike that of alcohol in the late nineteenth and early twentieth * medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act. The statute, to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense. But its provisions leave no doubt that the defense is unavailable.") (citation omitted).
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Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. that state law authorizing such impacted the scope of federal power to regulate interstate commerce. Justice Stevens wrote that limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation "in accordance with state law" cannot serve to place respondents' activities beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is "superior to that of the States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants," however legitimate or dire those necessities may be. 13 Marijuana's continuing illegality under federal law has far-reaching and potentially serious effects on those who choose to operate "cannabusinesses" in states where it is legal to do so. For example, if you are a Colorado dispensary owner you essentially operate an all-cash business because you are deprived of access to the banking system.
14 Dispensaries in Denver and elsewhere in Colorado spend enormous sums each year on security.
15 Consider, too, the implications of having lots of businesses that operate on an all-cash basis. The federal government has warned states that choose to legalize marijuana to take steps to prevent organized crime from using dispensaries as vehicles for money laundering. 16 Marijuana's illegality impacts canna-businesses' ability to access legal services as well. have to think about when they are advising their clients' canna-businesses.
There is also some risk of federal prosecution. The Department of Justice finally issued some guidance in 2013 with the so-called "Cole Memorandum."
21 That document laid out federal enforcement priorities and stated that as along as state experimentation did not involve any of the eight areas listed (access by minors and diversion to states where it is illegal are two), it was prepared to allow those experiments to continue. 22 But the Cole Memorandum is worth no more than the paper on which it is written. If the Hillary Clinton administration decides that legalization has not been successful, she can order the memo revoked, shut down dispensaries, and arrest their owners overnight.
Even if you do not operate a dispensary, but simply patronize one, you are at risk for prosecution. Unlawful users of controlled substances, for example, are prohibited from owning firearms. 23 The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is on record stating that medical marijuana users are prohibited from purchasing or possessing guns. 24 Thus, states that have legalized marijuana have inadvertently exposed some of their citizens to prosecution for federal firearms offenses that can carry hefty prison terms.
Even 21 Memorandum from James C. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to All United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275685 7467.pdf. 22 The others were (1) preventing proceeds from going to organized crime; (2) preventing stateauthorized sales from becoming cover for other illicit drug sales; (3) preventing violence and use of firearms in connection with production and distribution; (4) preventing drugged driving; (5) preventing growing on public lands; and (6) Early state court decisions took the position that state law legalizing marijuana created either an explicit conflict with or at least was impliedly preempted by the CSA. The Oregon Supreme Court, for example, held in 2010 that an employer that discharged an employee for medical marijuana use had not engaged in unlawful employment discrimination because the Oregon law permitting medical marijuana use was implicitly preempted by the CSA.
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The CSA's preemptive effect has also come up in the suit by Nebraska and Oklahoma against Colorado. 28 Those states (ultimately unsuccessfully 29 ) asked the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and to settle the question of the CSA's preemptive effects. The states argued that Colorado's legalization of marijuana was in direct conflict with the CSA and could not stand. 30 While the case for there being an express conflict between state and federal law is weak (the CSA does not forbid state legalization efforts) and because it is technically possible to comply with both regimes (if one does not engage in the activities permitted by state law), 31 it seems to me that state legalization at least serves as an obstacle to the purpose of the CSA, which was to eliminate the market in Schedule I substances. 32 The question of preemption is further complicated by the anticommandeering principle. 33 Because states retain some aspects of sovereignty, they cannot be made field offices of the federal government. That is, they cannot have their legislative or executive branches commandeered by Congress to enact legislation or enforce federal law. Congress, for example, could not pass a law requiring states legislatures, like Colorado's, to recriminalize marijuana, or require Colorado law enforcement personnel to enforce the CSA in the state. If the federal government wants to see the CSA enforced, it has its law enforcement agencies and Justice Department prosecutors who can do just that.
Thus, commentators have argued that the anti-commandeering principle really limits the preemptive effect of the CSA as a practical matter.
34 If Oklahoma and Nebraska had succeeded in getting the Court to take their case, and they got some sort of order scrapping Colorado's regulatory regime, the result would be the worst of both worlds because it would mean a completely unregulated market. A vacuum would exist as a result of preemption because Colorado could not be forced to reinstate criminal penalties and it would fall on the federal government to enforce the CSA within Colorado's borders. The result, so the argument runs, would be the marijuana equivalent of the Age of the Saloon, to which Prohibition was a reaction and proponents of repeal sought to avoid when alcohol again became legal. I am not sure that that argument carries much force because I think that neither state lawmakers nor the federal government would allow a completely unregulated marijuana market to exist in a state.
II.
Those are the vertical federalism problems, and I think they are quite serious. The preemption issue, in particular, is complicated. In addition, there are horizontal federalism aspects to legalized marijuana, which I will describe briefly.
Much like attempts to regulate alcohol in the years preceding Prohibition, states are grappling with problems of cross-border externalities generated when legalizing and prohibiting states are living cheek-by-jowl. This is not merely an issue of comity because the federal government will be on the lookout for spillover effects from one state into another. 35 Colorado tried to address this by limiting the amounts that nonresidents can buy per dispensary visit. A resident of Colorado can purchase from a dispensary in a single transaction the one ounce that the resident is able to possess legally. A nonresident will have to go to four different dispensaries because each is allowed to sell a nonresident only a quarter ounce per visit. Colorado's efforts to prevent diversion by pot tourists could run into constitutional problems. A particularly astute student of constitutional law will recognize that there is a potential Dormant Commerce Clause problem lurking in the Colorado law-and perhaps a Privileges and Immunities Clause problem as well. Courts generally take a dim view of state or local laws that explicitly treat nonresidents worse than residents, and I have argued that Colorado's provision-and I am sure that other states will adopt similar 34 Mikos, supra note 32; Young, supra note 32. 35 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (describing the Cole Memorandum). 36 Denning, One Toke, supra note *, at 2281-83 (describing Colorado's restrictions).
provisions to combat diversion-could face constitutional challenges. 37 However, I also argue that Colorado has strong arguments supporting this differential treatment. 38 The Dormant Commerce Clause exists primarily to thwart state economic protectionism. 39 Colorado is not trying to hoard marijuana for its citizens, in a bid, say, to drive down the price; nor is it attempting to give some economic advantage to in-state marijuana growers that it denies to those who come to Colorado from out of state. Rather, the state is trying to avoid scrutiny from the federal government and trouble with neighboring states that have chosen a different policy.
III.
What possible solutions exist to this diagonal federalism problem? For me, solutions would involve loosening both vertical and horizontal constraints to experimentation; in theory, this experimentation will in turn produce optimal policies that can be replicated. Here is where I think marijuana could take a page from the history of alcohol regulation. 40 Congressional exemptions from the CSA for states that pursue legalization, provided that they regulate marijuana responsibly, would obviously be most helpful. 41 Models of this cooperative federalism can be found in environmental statutes. 42 An opt-out would be an easy and elegant solution and might solve the attendant problems related to continued federal criminalization that plague businesses in states that have decided to legalize marijuana.
In addition, one of the big problems prior to Prohibition-one which might have hastened its appearance-was the inability of states to effectively
